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Abstract
Recent work in adversarial attacks has developed provably robust
methods for training deep neural network classifiers. However, although
they are often mentioned in the context of robustness, deep generative
models themselves have received relatively little attention in terms of
formally analyzing their robustness properties. In this paper, we propose
a method for training provably robust generative models, specifically a
provably robust version of the variational auto-encoder (VAE). To do so, we
first formally define a (certifiably) robust lower bound on the variational
lower bound of the likelihood, and then show how this bound can be
optimized during training to produce a robust VAE. We evaluate the
method on simple examples, and show that it is able to produce generative
models that are substantially more robust to adversarial attacks (i.e., an
adversary trying to perturb inputs so as to drastically lower their likelihood
under the model).
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks on deep learning system, the observation that deep classifiers
are particularly susceptible to small perturbations of inputs which can drastically
change class labels, have risen to prominence in recent years [24, 7]. Although
several methods have been proposed for defending classifiers again adversarial
attacks, many of the more heuristic approaches have proven ineffective [1]. Indeed,
at this point the two primary classes of defenses that have proven effective are
adversarial training [7, 14, 16], which is empirically effective but comes with no
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guarantees, and provably robust training [26, 19, 18], which provides guarantees
on the robustness of the resulting classifier but which empirically performs
slightly worse.
A common theme among many heuristic defenses is using generative models
to aid in the defense adversarial attacks, i.e., by attempting to “project” an input
into the latent space of a generative model [9], or use the generative model to
evaluate likelihood [21]. Such approaching are intuitively appealing: if we have
a generative process of our data, then we should be able to account for small
perturbations by either flagging them as out of distribution or finding closer
examples that do exist within the distribution. However as mentioned above,
despite this potential, such advantage is often not borne out in practice, and
generative-model-based approaches do not illustrate a demonstrable advantage
over traditional classifiers with adversarial training. We surmise that this is due
at least partially to the fact that deep generative models themselves are subject
to adversarial attacks. Indeed, although the majority of work in adversarial
attacks has focused on classification systems, recent work has also shown that
generative models are equally susceptible to such attacks [1]. And although
some preliminary work exists on using heuristic adversarial training to robustly
train generative models [12], the provably robust approach has no analogue in
generative models.
In this paper, we propose the first approach to training provably robust deep
generative models. Specifically, we develop an approach to training a provable
robust variational auto-encoder (VAE), a method based upon the so-called
evidence lower bound (ELBO) on the likelihood. Our basic approach is to define
a robust analogue of unsupervised maximum likelihood estimation, and then use
techniques from certifiable robustness to provide a strict lower bound on the
ELBO under adversarial perturbations. Owing to the terms in the ELBO for
VAEs, this lower bound is substantially more complex than in the classification
setting (where the goal of the adversary is simply to maximize a linear function of
the last layer of the network); key to our analysis is the adversarial optimization
problem can be framed as a maximizing a set of separable convex functions over
unit intervals, which has a simple closed form solution despite being a non-convex
problem.
To show the effect of provably robust deep models, we compare the per-
formance of a VAE trained in a regular fashion, i.e. with the ELBO as the
objective, with the performance of provably robust VAE (proVAE) where the
objective is the lower bound of the ELBO for different values of maximum
allowed perturbation (considering perturbations within an `p ball of radius
train). This performance is measured by evaluating how adversarial attacks
affect the log-likelihood / ELBO of the generative model as the attacks become
increasingly stronger - projected gradient descent (PGD) attacks with increasing
radius attack. The models that are trained in a robust fashion can better defend
against the adversarial attacks (higher log-likelihood at higher values of attack
as train increases). Unsurprisingly, increased of robustness comes at the cost of
lower log-likelihood when no perturbations exists, analogous to what accuracy
decrease trade-off present in robustly trained classifiers, and we analyze these
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trade-off in detail, both in terms of the log-likelihood but also in terms of the
quality of samples generated from the model.
2 Background and preliminaries
Adversarial deep learning Recent years have seen an increased interest in
adversarial attacks on machine learning systems [24, 7]. This interest is motivated
both by security considerations for deep learning system [4], and by the general
extent to which adversarial examples cast doubt upon our understanding of
what the classifier may be actually picking up on in images [25, 10]. In the
classification setting, the most common formulation of adversarial robustness
replaces the normal expected loss of a classifier
Ex,y∼D [`(hθ(x), y)] (1)
(where D represents the data distribution over inputs x and outputs y, hθ is our
network, and ` is a classification loss function), with a term that evaluates the
worst-case loss over some perturbation applied to the inputs
Ex,y∼D
[
max
δ∈∆(x)
`(hθ(x+ δ), y)
]
(2)
where ∆(x) denotes the allowable set of perturbations. These inner maximization
problems, which are non-convex owning to the deep network, (and the resulting
training, which minimizes the loss over θ) are typically solved by one of two
approaches. First, in adversarial training, we empirically find a δ that maximizes
the inner optimization, usually via iterative methods such as projected gradient
descent (PDG) [14, 16]; this works well in practice, but doesn’t avoid the
possibility that some worse attack exists that cannot be found by PGD. Second,
in provably robust methods, we construct a closed-form upper bound on the
inner maximization problem
max
δ∈∆(x)
`(hθ(x+ δ), y) ≤ L(x,∆(x), y) (3)
where L can be constructed in any number of ways, such as linear programming
relaxations and their duals [26, 27, 3], semidefinite relaxations [19, 20], forward
bound propagation using zonotopes [18, 22], or simple box constraints (known
as interval bound propagation) [8].
In this paper, we will adopt this later approach of construction a provable
bound on the loss, but do so in the context of unsupervised generative models
rather than supervised classification tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first such application of provably robust training in the context of generative
models.
Robust generative models Although the vast majority of work in adversarial
attacks and defenses has focused on the classification setting (or to a lesser extent,
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other supervised settings such as object detection [28, 23], or image segmentation
[5, 17]), a smaller body of work has indeed looked at the possibility of extending
these attacks to generative models [6, 12, 2].
Broadly speaking, these works have focused largely on the attack side of
the problem, and less on the defense. In general we will focus in this paper on
likelihood based generative models, i.e., models that (usually, approximately)
maximize some likelihood function
Ex∼D[log p(x)] (4)
for D a distribution over samples x and log pθ(x) the likelihood of the sample
under the model. In general, there are two possible classes of attacks on
likelihood-based generative model, which we refer to out-of-distribution attacks
and into-distribution attacks. In out-of-distribution attacks, the goal is to take
some sample from the distribution x ∈ D (where we abuse notation slightly to
indicate that this sample has high likelihood under the true distribution) and
perturb it slightly to lower its likelihood
min
δ∈∆(x)
log pθ(x+ δ). (5)
In into-distribution attacks, the goal is to take some sample x 6∈ D and perturb
it so as to maximize its likelihood so that it no longer appears to belong to the
modeled distribution
max
δ∈∆(x)
log pθ(x+ δ). (6)
Although both classes of attacks are relevant, we focus here on out-of-
distribution attacks, as it is a much closer analogue of robust adversarial training
in the classification setting. The into-distribution class of attacks is substantially
more challenging (it is difficult, for instance, to capture a distribution of all sam-
ples not in D), which mirrors the case in classification, where even robust models
can sometime mistakenly classify images never seen in the input distribution [];
thus, exploring these classes of attacks are left for future work.
The variational auto-encoder In this work, we will consider the variational
auto-encoder (VAE) [11] as the generative model of choice. This is due to the
fact that the VAE explicitly is trained based upon a bound on the log-likelihood,
which we further bound in the adverarial setting. A VAE is trained based upon
the so-called evidence lower bound (ELBO) L(x), which expresses the probability
p(x) in terms of a latent variable z ∈ Rk and then bounds the likelihood as
log p(x) = log
∫
p(x|z)p(z)dz ≥ Ez∼q(z|x)[log p(x|z)]−KL(q(z|x)||p(z)) ≡ L(x)
(7)
where q(z|x) is a so-called variational distribution, that attempts to approximate
the posterior p(z|x) (for which case the bound is tight), but which does so via a
more tractable distribution class. In the VAE setting, we choose
q(z|x) = N (z;µθ(x), σ2θ(x)I), p(x|z) = N (x; gθ(z), σ20I), p(z) = N (z; 0, I)
(8)
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where µθ(x) and σ2θ(x) are the “encoder” networks that predict the mean and
variance of the Normal distribution q from the input x, and gθ(z) is the “decoder”
network that generates a sample in input space given a latent vector z.
Under these assumptions, the ELBO has the explicit form
L(x, θ) = 1
2
(
Ez∼N (µ(x),σ2(x)I)
[
σ20‖x− gθ(z)‖22
]
+1T (log σ2θ(x)−σ2θ(x))−‖µθ(x)‖2
)
+c
(9)
where c is a constant. The encoder and decoder networks are jointly trained to
maximize this lower bound
max
θ
Ex∼D[L(x; θ)] (10)
typically using stochastic gradient descent, where we replace the sampling
procedure z ∼ N (µ(x), σ2(x)I) with the equivalent process z = µ(x) +σ(x) ·  ∼
N (0, I) to ensure that the mean and variance terms can be backpropagated
through (this is the so-called reparameterization trick.
3 Provably robust deep generative models
Overview This section addresses the problem of formulating a robust defense
against out-of-distribution attacks on deep generative models. We achieve
such defense by obtaining a provable robust deep generative models that lower-
bounds the ELBO for any admissible perturbation. Let ∆train(x) be the set
of admissible perturbations, a `∞ ball of radius train centered around x (for
lightness of notation, we will use ∆train(x) and ∆(x) interchangeably). We can
obtain a lower bound for the ELBO for all the possible perturbations δ ∈ ∆(x)
as
L(x) ≤ L(x+ δ) ≤ log(p(x+ δ)) (11)
This lower bound provides a certificate of robustness of ELBO: the effect on
ELBO of any possible perturbation in ∆(x) will be lower bound by L. The
optimization of the lower bound L effectively trains the network to be robust to
the strongest possible out-of-distribution attack within ∆(x) (`∞ ball of radius
train around x).
3.1 Interval bound propagation on ELBO
In order to lower bound the ELBO, we will have to perform interval bound
propagation throughout the layers of µθ, σθ, and gθ such that we can obtain
bounds for the propagation of the perturbations on the input space in terms
of the ELBO. This means that we must bound both the KL divergence of the
perturbed input KL(q(z|x+ δ)||p(z)) and the expected value of the perturbed
conditional log-likelihood σ20‖x−gθ(z)‖22. We do so by performing interval bound
propagation on the encoder networks µθ and σθ, and on the decoder network gθ.
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3.1.1 Preliminaries
We start by illustrating how to propagate lower and upper bounds on the building
blocks of the encoder and decoder networks: linear and convolution layers, and
monotonic element-wise activation functions. This allows us to sequentially
connect the different interval bounds, from input to output of the network.
For lightness of notation, we will denote the upper bound of u as u and the
lower bound as u, these should be considered element-wise when addressing
multidimensional entities.
Linear operators Let us consider Wv a linear operator W applied to v, and
(v, v) the element-wise upper and lower bounds of v. We can decompose the
linear operator W in positive and negative operators W = W+ +W− such that
W+ = max(W, 0) and W− = min(W, 0), where max and min correspond to
element-wise maximum and minimum. Then the upper and lower bounds of the
linear operator applied to v are
Wv = W+v +W−v,
Wv = W+v +W−v. (12)
These bounds hold for convolution layers and linear layers, due to their
linear nature.
Monotonic functions Let vt = h(vt−1) denote a monotonic (non-decreasing
or non-increasing) function applied element-wise on vt−1. We can express the
upper and lower bounds of vt in terms of h and the upper and lower bounds of
vt−1 as follows,
vt = max{h(vt−1), h(vt−1)},
vt = min{h(vt−1), h(vt−1)}. (13)
These bounds hold for monotonic activation functions, such as ReLU and
sigmoid.
`2 Norm squared The lower and upper bounds of the `2 norm squared of v
can be easily obtained by noting that there is an element-wise dependency on
the lower and upper bounds of v. As ‖v‖22 =
∑n
i=1 v
2
i , where vi denotes the
ith component of v, we can obtain the respective upper and lower bounds as a
function of v and v as follows,
‖v‖2 =
n∑
i=1
max{vi2,vi2},
‖v‖2 =
n∑
i=1
min{vi2,vi2}. (14)
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3.1.2 Interval bound propagation on the encoder networks
Given the encoder networks µθ, and σθ, we construct the encoder networks to
be a succession of convolutional layers with ReLU activations with the last layer
being a fully connected linear layer. Let us consider a perturbation xi + δ where
δ ∈ ∆train(xi), where we can have lower and upper bound of the perturbation
as
xi = xi + train1; xi = xi − train1. (15)
With the propagation of the interval bounds for linear and convolution layers
in (12) and for the activation functions in (13), we can bound the output of
the encoder network based on the interval bound propagation of xi and xi
throughout the components of the encoder network,
µi = min{µθ(xi), µθ(xi)), µi = max{µθ(xi), µθ(xi)) (16)
σi = min{σθ(xi), σθ(xi)), σi = max{σθ(xi), µθ(xi)), (17)
where µi = µθ(xi) and σi = σθ(xi) are the outputs of the encoder networks.
This results in bounds for the output of the encoder network µi, for σi, and for
log σi (as logarithm and exponential are monotonic non-decreasing) as function
of the magnitude train of the perturbation ∆(xi).
KL divergence Given the bounds on the output of the encoder network, we
can bound the KL divergence between N (µi, σiI) and N (0, I) as follows.
KL = −1
2
J∑
j=1
(1 + max{log(σi)2j − (σi)2j , log(σi)2j − (σi)2j} − (min{(µi)2j , (µi)2j}),
KL = −1
2
J∑
j=1
(1 + min{log(σi)2j − (σi)2j , log(σi)2j − (σi)2j} − (max{(µi)2j , (µi)2j}),
(18)
where (µi)2j and (σi)2j denote the jth component of the squared mean and
covariance of the ith sample, as outputed by the encoder networks.
3.1.3 Interval bound propagation on decoder network
Now we perform the interval bound propagation through the decoder network,
continuing from the bounds on µi and σi at the end of the encoder networks.
We start by obtaining bounds on the latent variable taking in account the
reparameterization trick.
Reparameterization trick The bound on the latent variable using the repa-
rameterization trick follows from the bound for linear operators in (12), as the
reparameterization is a linear operator. Let  ∼ N (), I), + = max(, 0) and
− = min(, 0) such that  = + +−. The reparameterization trick decouples the
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randomness from the encoder by expressing the latent variable as zi = µi + σi.
We have then that the latent variable zi, after reparameterization trick, can be
bound as
zi = µi + σi− + σi+, zi = µi + σi− + σi+. (19)
Decoder network The bounds on the latent variable z are then propagated
through the decoder network gθ, as it is composed of linear and convolutional
layers (linear operators where bounds can be propagated with (12)) with ReLU
and sigmoid activations (monotonic activation functions where bounds can be
propagated with (13)). This means that we can have bounds on the output of
the decoder network as a function of the bounds on the latent vector zi, as with
the encoder networks.
Conditional log-likelihood The remaining element that remains to be bound
is the conditional log-likelihood log p(xi|zi) We fix the the diagonal covariance
σ0I in p(xi|zi) = N (x; gθ(zi), σ20I). This reduces the problem of bounding the
conditional log-likelihood to bounding ‖xi − gθ(zi)‖2. Following (14), we can
bound it by
‖xi − gθ(zi)‖2 =
M∑
j=1
max{(xi + train1− gθ(zi))2, (xi − train1− gθ(zi))2}j ,
‖xi − gθ(zi)‖2 =
M∑
j=1
min{(xi + train1− gθ(zi))2, (xi − train1− gθ(zi))2}j ,
(20)
where we are taking the element-wise max and min and summing in j across
the elements of x.
3.2 Lower Bound on ELBO
Finally, we can combine the upper and lower bounds for the encoder network and
decoder networks, and associated lower bounds on the conditional log-likelihood
and upper bound on the KL divergence, as the ELBO takes in account the
negative of the KL divergence, obtaining the following bound
L(xi, θ) = 1
2
J∑
j=1
(1 + min{log(σi)2j − (σi)2j , log(σi)2j − (σi)2j} − (max{(µi)2j , (µi)2j})+
+
1
2σ20
E∼N (0,I)
M∑
j=1
min
{
(xi + train1− gθ(zi))2, (xi − train1− gθ(zi))2,
(xi + train1− gθ(zi))2, (xi − train1− gθ(zi))2
}
j
,
(21)
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where we have the upper and lower bounds for the encoder networks propagated,
and the reparameterization trick as
zi = µi + σi− + σi+, zi = µi + σi+ + σi−,
µi = min{µθ(xi + train1), µθ(xi − train1)},
µi = max{µθ(xi + train1), µθ(xi − train1)},
σi = min{σθ(xi + train1), σθ(xi − train1)},
σi = max{σθ(xi + train1), σθ(xi − train1)}.
Provable robustness The resulting lower bound on the ELBO lower bounds
the log-likelihood of a perturbed sample log p(xi + δ), working as a robustness
certificate for the perturbation. This means that if L ≥ α with input interval
bounds fed into the encoder being xi − train1 and xi + train1 (an `∞ ball
centered in xi of radius train), this guarantees that log p(x + δ) ≥ α for all
δ : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ train.
3.3 Training a provably robust variational auto-encoder
by optimizing the lower bound
We can train the provably robust deep generative model by optimizing the lower
bound of the ELBO L, corresponding to optimizing the robustness certificate,
instead of optimizing the ELBO L directly.
Algorithm 1 Training a provably robust deep generative model - single epoch
input train, X = {x1, . . . ,xN}
for xi ∈ X
(xi,xi) = (xi − train1,xi + train1) {initial bounds on input}
(µi, µi) = (min{µθ(xi), µθ(xi)},max{µθ(xi), µθ(xi)}) {propagate bounds on output of
encoder µθ}
(σi, σi) = (min{σθ(xi), σθ(xi)},max{σθ(xi), σθ(xi)}) {propagate bounds on output of
encoder σθ}
 ∼ N (0, I) {draw sample for reparameterization trick}
zi = µi + σi− + σi+, zi = µi + σi+ + σi− {propagate bounds on latent variable
zi}
(gi, gi) = (min{gθ(zi), gθ(zi)},max{gθ(zi), gθ(zi)}) {propagate bounds on output of
encoder gθ}
compute L(xi, θ) with (21)
θ ← θ + η∇θL(xi, θ){update encoder and decoder networks to maximize lower bound
of ELBO}
endfor
output µθ, σθ, gθ
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a) Unperturbed test samples b) PGD attack on VAE
c) PGD attack on proVAE train = 0.01 d) PGD attack on proVAE train = 0.1
Figure 1: Example of adversarial examples on MNIST using the PGD attack
with attack = 0.1 on the initial unperturbed test samples shown in a).
4 Experimental results
Dataset and Architectures We illustrate the robustness of the proposed
provably robust training approach for deep generative models on two datasets:
MNIST image classification [15] and CIFAR10 [13]. For the encoder network
architectures we test a network composed of two convolutional layers of 32 and
64 filters and a fully connected layer of 3136 units for MNIST and 4096 units for
CIFAR10, with ReLU activations. The final layer has 50 units and no activation,
corresponding to a 50 dimensional lantent space (z ∈ R50), and the encoder
networks µθ, σθ share all the weights except for the final layer of 50 units (in
practice σθ will output log σθ). For the decoder network with test a network
composed of a fully connected layer of 3136 units for MNIST and 4096 units for
CIFAR10, and two convolutional layers of 64 and 32 filters, with ReLu activations
with exception of the last convolutional layer that has a sigmoid activation.
Table 1: Train and test values for ELBO L and lower bound for ELBO L in
unperturbed data (MNIST and CIFAR) for proVAE models trained robustly
with different values of radius train of the `∞ of perturbations. We note that
when train = 0 training the lower bound of the ELBO in proVAE defaults into
training a VAE by optimizing the ELBO.
MNIST
train L train L test L test
0.00 −28.54 −28.36 −28.36
0.01 −36.44 −36.06 −32.35
0.02 −39.69 −39.21 −33.97
0.05 −44.79 −44.39 −36.78
0.1 −54.49 −54.49 −43.41
CIFAR
train L train L test L test
0.00 −76.08 −76.13 −76.13
0.01 −111.26 −111.55 −92.74
0.02 −132.12 −132.14 −97.39
0.05 −193.93 −193.91 −105.17
0.1 −296.52 −296.52 −138.55
Summary of results The final training and test lower bounds of ELBO and
test ELBO for different data sets and different proVAE models trained with
different train are given in Table 1. These lower bounds for the ELBO for
different train are consistent with the ELBO of those models when subject to a
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Figure 2: Test sample reconstruction of unperturbed data (left) and attacked
data (right). Top rows corresponds to reconstruction using VAE (L = −28.28 for
unperturbed and L = −113.97 for attacked), middle rows to proVAE train = 0.01
(L = −31.10 for unperturbed and L = −59.08 for attacked), and bottom rows to
proVAE train = 0.1 (L = −41.31 for unperturbed and L = −50.06 for attacked).
Test samples for unperturbed data come from Figure 1 (a), and for the attacked
data corresponds to the PGD attack with attack = 0.1 in Figure 1 (b,c,d) for
each respective model.
MNIST CIFAR10
Figure 3: Effect of adversarial attack (PGD in an `∞ ball of radius attack for
0 ≤ attack ≤ 0.2) on the ELBO L for classifiers trained with different values of
train (the VAE in bold blue corresponds to train = 0) on MNIST and CIFAR10.
This clearly illustrates the fast decay of L for the non-robust classifier and how,
and how by training a provably robust classifier we can mitigate this decay at
the expense of a lower value of L on unperturbed (attack=0) data.
PGD attack of magnitude attack that are given in Figure 3. At lower values of
attack the models trained at lower train have better performance (higher ELBO
as seen in Figure 3, and generating samples of better quality in Figure 4) than
the models trained at higher train. However, as attack increases, the models
trained at higher train outperform the models trained at lower train. We point
to Figure 1 for examples of PGD attacks (attack = 0.1) on VAE and proVAE
(train = 0.01 and train = 0.1) on MNIST, and to Figure 2 for examples of the
reconstructions for the different models of the unperturbed data and from the
data perturbed by the PGD attacks. In Figure 4 we find example of samples
randomly drawn from those models on MNIST and CIFAR10. These trade-offs
between performance of the nonrobust and robust models as we evaluate them
on adversarial and nonadversarial conditions are a clear indication that model
robustness comes at a cost, in parallel to the accuracy trade-offs of robustly
trained classifiers. However, training a model to be robust to small perturbations
(train ≈ 0) can easily provide more robustness than a traditionally trained mode,
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at a small cost to the ELBO on nonadversarial conditions.
VAE proVAE train = 0.01 proVAE train = 0.10
Figure 4: MNIST and CIFAR10 samples drawn from gθ(),  ∼ N (0, I). The
cost of robustness against attacks is present as the samples drawn from more
robust models have lower quality, both on MNIST (samples have less sharpness),
and on CIFAR (samples degenerate into blurs).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a method for training provably robust generative
models (VAE) based on defining a robust lower bound to the variational lower
bound of the likelihood and optimizing this bound to train a robust generative
model (proVAE). This methodology introduces provable defenses against adver-
sarial attacks into the domain of generative models, namely out-of-distribution
attacks where we perturb a sample to lower its likelihood. The experimental
results corroborate the effectiveness of this provable defense, and introduce a
new flavor of trade-offs associated with model robustness. Whereas this is a
significant step towards improving robustness of generative models there are clear
directions for improvement. The most compelling direction for improvement is
towards creating defenses against into-distribution attacks, where adversarial
attacks can perturb a sample out-of-distribution (x 6∈ D) to make it appear as if
it comes from distribution x ∈ D.
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